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ABSTRACT
Three appellate decisions illustrate the difficulty of
acquiring trademark protection for domain names that
include a top-level domain (“TLD”), such as “.com.”
Courts have characterized these marks as generic or
merely descriptive, which carries implications for the party
seeking registration: generic marks cannot be protected,
while descriptive marks can, assuming they possess a
secondary meaning that makes the mark distinctive.
Generic and descriptive domain names often indicate the
services a company provides, with the addition of the
“.com” TLD to indicate online services. One key test of
genericness is whether the public identifies the mark with a
service generally or with a company specifically. This
Article examines the rationales supporting the genericdescriptive distinction for domain names with TLDs. When
a website does more than merely sell a product online that
could be obtained in a brick and mortar store—such as
providing additional consumer tools and flexibility unique
to the online medium—the domain name has an increased
chance of being viewed as descriptive and potentially
protectable.
*
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INTRODUCTION
Several recent federal appeals court opinions have denied
federal trademark protection to online domain names such as
“STEELBUILDING.COM,”
“MATTRESS.COM,”
and
“ADVERTISE.COM,” citing their generic nature or lack of
descriptiveness. 1 In the process, the courts have blurred the
distinction between generic and merely descriptive marks. Generic
terms that describe what the service is, instead of who provides the
service, rarely gain protection through the addition of the top-level
domain (“TLD”) “.com” as part of a domain name. Generic marks
cannot be registered under trademark law. Descriptive marks must
1

See In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2005); In re
1800MATTRESS.COM IP, LLC, 586 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2009);
Advertise.com, Inc. v. AOL Advertising, Inc., 616 F.3d 974, 982 (9th Cir.
2010).
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have a secondary meaning that identifies the source of the service,
as recognized by the consuming public, for possible federal
trademark protection. The addition of a TLD does not enhance the
potential trademark protection of generic or descriptive domain
names, but the possibility of new TLDs such as “.sports” or “.law”
will present new frontiers for possible trademark registration.
This Article provides a brief overview of trademark
distinctiveness and standards of review, and then examines the
rationales behind three federal appellate court decisions, including
two registration appeals and one trademark infringement appeal.
Next, the Article attempts to synthesize what factors a court might
consider when categorizing a domain name as generic or
descriptive. Finally, the Article considers the recent announcement
that the universe of TLDs will soon be expanded significantly.
I. TRADEMARK DISTINCTIVENESS OVERVIEW
Marks are generally classified in one of four categories:
generic, descriptive, suggestive, or arbitrary/fanciful. 2 These “lines
of demarcation, however, are not always bright,” and a “term may
shift from one category to another in light of differences in usage
through time.” 3
A generic term is one that “refers, or has come to be
understood as referring, to the genus of which the particular
product is a species.” 4 A generic term, by definition, identifies a
type of product, not the source of the product. 5 Generic terms are
not entitled to legal protection. 6 A generic term “cannot function as
an indicator of the source of a product . . . because the relevant
2

Abercrombie & Fitch, Co., v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir.
1976).
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
In re Gould Paper Corp., 834 F.2d 1017, 1018 (Fed. Cir. 1987); see also
Thomas L. Casagrande, Of Lawyers, Hotels, and Mattresses: The Federal
Circuit’s Ever-expanding Genericness Test for [Thing].com Marks, 3.1
LANDSLIDE, Sept./Oct. 2010, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
migrated/intelprop/magazine/LANDSLIDE_Sept2010_Casagrande.authcheckda
m.pdf.
6
Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 9.
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public understands the term primarily as the common name for the
product.” 7 As distinguished from descriptive marks, generic terms
cannot be saved even by proof of secondary meaning. 8 Courts
deny trademark protection for generic marks because a trademark
cannot deprive competing manufacturers of “the right to call an
article by its name.” 9
A non-generic mark that is deemed “merely descriptive,”
because it describes a good or service, will likewise not receive
trademark protection. 10 Protecting merely descriptive marks would
“confer a monopoly not only of the mark but of the product by
rendering a competitor unable effectively to name what it was
endeavoring to sell.” 11 Yet descriptive marks may qualify for
registration if they acquire “secondary meaning,” or
distinctiveness. 12 To show that a mark has acquired distinctiveness,
the applicant must demonstrate that “the relevant public
understands the primary significance of the mark as identifying the
source of a product or service rather than the product or service
itself.” 13
The third category, “suggestive” marks, is difficult to define.
One court observed that a term is suggestive if it requires
“imagination, thought, and perception to reach a conclusion as to
the nature of the goods.” 14 Judge Learned Hand remarked, “the
validity of the mark ends where suggestion ends and description
begins.” 15 “If a term is suggestive, it is entitled to trademark
7

In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing In re
Dial-A-Mattress, 240 F.3d 1341, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
8
Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 9.
9
Id. (citing J. Kohnstam, Ltd. v. Louis Marx and Co., 280 F.2d 437
(C.C.P.A. 1960)).
10
Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 10.
11
Id.
12
15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2006); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505
U.S. 763, 769 (1992).
13
In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 163 (1995)).
14
Stix Products, Inc. v. United Merchants & Manufacturers Inc., 295 F.
Supp. 479, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
15
Franklin Knitting Mills, Inc. v. Fashionit Sweater Mills, Inc., 297 F. 247,
248 (2d Cir. 1923), aff’d per curiam, 4 F.2d 1018 (2d Cir. 1925).
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protection without proof of secondary meaning.” 16 If the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) registers a mark without
requiring proof of secondary meaning, there is “a rebuttable
presumption that the mark is suggestive or arbitrary/fanciful,
instead of merely descriptive.” 17
“Arbitrary” or “fanciful” terms enjoy the trademark protection
of suggestive terms, but are not subject to a “merely descriptive”
analysis. 18 Fanciful, as a “classifying concept,” is “usually applied
to words invented solely for their use as trademarks.” 19 Arbitrary
categorization can apply to common words used in an unfamiliar
way. 20 For example, “Apple” is an arbitrary mark for a company
that makes computers. 21
II. REGISTRATION/APPEALS PROCESS AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Trademark Registration Appeals
The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”) makes
factual determinations of whether an asserted mark is generic. 22
The TTAB is an administrative adjudicative body that hears
appeals from final registration decisions of trademark examiners.23
To deny the registration of a mark as generic, the USPTO has the
burden of “substantially showing . . . that the matter is in fact
generic . . . based on clear evidence of generic use.” 24
When a plaintiff receives a federal trademark registration from
the USPTO, she is entitled to a presumption that the mark is
16

Abercrombie & Fitch, Co., v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 11 (2d
Cir. 1976).
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id. at n.12.
20
Id.
21
See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 973 F.2d 1033,
1041 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing 1 J.T. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 11:22, at 498-99 (2d ed. 1984)).
22
In re Pennington Seed, Inc., 466 F.3d 1053, 1056 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
23
15 U.S.C. § 1070 (West 2010); see also Casagrande, supra note 5.
24
In re Am. Fertility Soc’y, 188 F.3d 1341, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (quoting
In re Merrill Lynch, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 828 F.2d 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
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valid. 25 Once registered, the trademark owner has the exclusive
right to use the mark in commerce in connection with the goods or
services specified in registration. 26 This presumption of validity
can be rebutted with a showing by a preponderance of the evidence
that the mark is not protectable. 27
The Federal Circuit has appellate jurisdiction over TTAB’s
registration decisions. 28 The Federal Circuit reviews the TTAB’s
legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for substantial
evidence. 29 Substantial evidence is defined as “more than a mere
scintilla” and “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind would
accept as adequate” to support a conclusion. 30
B. Trademark Infringement Appeal
A federal court of appeals reviews a district court’s ruling on a
matter of law under the de novo standard. 31 Whether “secondary
meaning” exists is reviewed under the “clearly erroneous”
standard. 32 To prevail on an infringement claim, the plaintiff must
demonstrate (1) rights in a mark, (2) priority in the mark over the
defendant’s rights, and (3) a “likelihood of confusion” as a result
of the offending mark. “Likelihood of confusion” is a mixed
question of law and fact, which is reviewed under the “clearly
erroneous” standard. 33
25

555-1212.com, Inc. v. Comm. House Int’l, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 2d 1084,
1088 (N.D. Cal. 2001); see 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (West 2010).
26
555-1212.com, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1088.
27
See Vuitton Et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enterprises, Inc., 644 F.2d 769, 776
(9th Cir. 1981).
28
15 U.S.C. § 1071(a)(1) (2010).
29
In re Pacer Tech., 338 F.3d 1348, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
30
Id. (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
31
Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 778 F.2d 1352, 1355 (9th Cir.
1985).
32
Id.
33
Id. (“Likelihood of confusion is the type of mixed question which fits
within the categories suggested in McConney as suited to clearly erroneous
review—cases not implicating constitutional rights and those ‘in which the
applicable legal standard provides for a strictly factual test, such as state of
mind.’”) (citing United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195 (9th Cir.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984)).
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III. STEELBUILDING.COM: DESCRIPTIVE, BUT LACKING
SECONDARY MEANING
Businesses operating online face significant challenges when
trying to gain trademark protection for their domain names. Many
commercial websites allow consumers to access inventory or
services available in brick and mortar stores. Some businesses,
however, use the Internet as a vehicle to offer additional services
unique to the online forum. The Steelbuilding court confronted
whether a domain name could be trademarked for a business that
involved the development and construction of steel buildings, but
also allowed its customers to design and view their buildings in an
online environment. 34 The Federal Circuit vacated the TTAB
determination that the mark “STEELBUILDING.COM” was
generic, but affirmed the TTAB’s finding that the mark is merely
descriptive without secondary meaning, and thereby denied
trademark protection. 35
A. Generic Mark Test
To determine whether the mark was generic, the court applied
a two-prong test: first, the court determined the “genus” of goods
or services at issue; second, the court analyzed whether the term
sought to be registered is understood by the relevant public
“primarily to refer to that genus of goods or services.” 36
The court first determined what core services the business
provided. The company sold steel building materials online, but it
also provided services that extended beyond mere sales: users
could design and purchase their own unique buildings online. 37 Its
online catalogue permitted users to determine an appropriate price
for their building designs, facilitating users’ construction of their
buildings in a flexible and fluid online environment. 38 Importantly,
34

In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1296.
36
Id. at 1296-97 (citing H. Marvin Ginn Corp. v. Int’l Ass’n of Fire Chiefs,
782 F.2d 987, 990 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
37
Id. at 1298.
38
Id.
35
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the court noted that the website was more than a “shopping guide”
that listed materials and prices. 39 As a “STEELBUILDING.COM”
user developed a building design online, the program
“recalculate[d] design elements as necessary to meet codes and
other engineering requirements.” 40 What the website really offered
was a software program that helped users meet economic,
regulatory, and aesthetic constraints. 41 Potential purchasers could
compare prices of different designs and decide which one best fit
their needs. 42
The Federal Circuit determined that the TTAB failed to
acknowledge “the interactive design feature of the applicant’s
goods and services.” 43 As such, the court concluded the TTAB
misunderstood the proper genus for “STEELBUILDING.COM,”
having defined it as “the sale of pre-engineered ‘steel buildings’ on
the Internet.” 44 Sale of steel buildings was a significant component
of the service, but so was the interactive design feature of the
website. 45 This mischaracterization of the genus required the
Federal Circuit to vacate the TTAB’s decision to deny registration
on generic grounds. 46
B. Examining the Entire Mark, Including the TLD
The Federal Circuit also reviewed the TTAB’s analysis of the
compound word “steelbuilding” and its bifurcation of
“STEELBUILDING.COM” into two separate marks: the
compound word “steelbuilding” and the TLD indicator “.com.” In
a previous case, the Federal Circuit observed that trademark
registration could be denied where there was substantial evidence
of “separate words joined to form a compound [that has] a
meaning identical to the meaning common usage would ascribe to
39

Id.
Id. at 1298.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 1297.
44
Id. at 1298.
45
Id.
46
Id.
40
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those words as a compound.” 47 The court referenced the attempted
registration of “screenwipe” for a product defined by the applicant
as a “wipe” for “screens”—the mark was rejected because the
terms “remain[ed] as generic in compound as individually.” 48 Yet
here, the record did not show that “steelbuilding,” as a compound
word, meant the same thing as the generic words “steel” and
“building.” 49 No dictionary definitions or other sources suggested
that joining the separate words “steel” and “building” would create
a generic word. 50 The Federal Circuit therefore held that the TTAB
did not sufficiently weigh the ambiguities and multiple meanings
of the composite word. 51 In other words, “steelbuilding” could be
more than just a composite noun of the adjective “steel” and noun
“building.” Instead, “steelbuilding” could function as a verb, fitting
the unique services provided on the website: it allowed users to
“steelbuild.”
Second, the court found the TTAB did not adequately consider
the entire mark including the TLD indicator. The Federal Circuit
acknowledged the general rule that only in “rare instances” will the
addition of a TLD indicator to a descriptive term operate to create
a distinctive mark. 52 The TLD must still be weighed, however, as
the addition of “.com” added meaning to the mark because it
showed “Internet-related distinctiveness, intimating some ‘Internet
feature.’” 53 The TLD “.com” expanded the mark to “include
Internet services that include ‘building’ or designing steel
structures on the website and then calculating the appropriate price
before ordering the unique structure.” 54 Again, the possible usage
of “steelbuilding” as a verb denoting online services defeated
denial of registration on generic grounds.

47

In re Gould Paper Corp., 834 F.2d 1017, 1018 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
Id. at 1019.
49
Steelbuilding, 415 F.3d at 1299.
50
Id. at 1298-99.
51
Id.
52
In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 373 F.3d 1171, 1175 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
53
Id. at 1175-76.
54
Steelbuilding, 834 F.3d at 1299.
48
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C. “STEELBUILDING.COM” Is Merely Descriptive
Although the Federal Circuit vacated the generic analysis of
the
TTAB,
it
held
that
the
record
showed
“STEELBUILDING.COM” was merely descriptive of the online
services provided and devoid of secondary meaning. 55 Based on
evidence from features listed on the website and in the applicant’s
own advertisements, the Federal Circuit agreed with the TTAB’s
conclusion that the sale of steel buildings was a significant feature
of the applicant’s services. 56 Considering the impact of the TLD
indicator, the Federal Circuit concluded that adding “.com” simply
identified that the services were provided in an online
environment. 57 In terms of descriptiveness, the record showed that
a consumer would recognize the compound word “steelbuilding”
as indistinguishable from the phrase “steel buildings,” meriting
denial of registration. 58 The burden for showing the mark had
acquired secondary meaning was on the applicant, whose
advertising efforts and name recognition polling failed to show the
mark had acquired distinctiveness. 59
Ultimately, the Federal Circuit was not convinced that
“steelbuilding” sufficiently led consumers to think of the specific
applicant’s business. The dissenting opinion argued that the
domain name was more than a mere address, and that recognition
of the domain name was potentially a form of source
identification. 60 In other words, the domain name would be
distinctive as it communicated information regarding the source or
the sponsor of the site. The dissent argued the TTAB did not
55

Id. at 1300.
Id. at 1299.
57
Id. at 1300.
58
Id. The possibility of a “double entendre” must be validated by consumer
appreciation of such an interpretation. The Federal Circuit would later use
similar language in discussing “MATTRESS.COM,” observing that Dial-AMattress “presented no evidence that the relevant public finds such a double
entendre.” In re 1800Mattress.com IP, LLC, 586 F.3d 1359,1364 (Fed. Cir.
2009). However, it is unclear how “mattress” could have ever been construed to
contain a double entendre.
59
Steelbuilding, 834 F.3d at1300-01.
60
Id. at 1301.
56
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properly weigh the advertising efforts and other evidence of
customer recognition. 61 Instead of affirming, the dissent would
have remanded to consider evidence that individuals viewed
“STEELBUILDING.COM” as a source identifying the company,
not just the product. 62
IV. IN RE 1800MATRESS.COM: A SIMPLER CASE OF
GENERICNESS
Four years later, the Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB’s
denial of registration for a domain name purely on grounds that the
name was generic. 63 In its evaluation of “MATTRESS.COM,” the
court did not entertain the possibility of a descriptive category or
secondary meaning. 64
The TTAB found that the genus of the mark was online retail
store services in the field of mattresses, beds, and bedding.65
Reasoning that “MATTRESS.COM” would be understood by the
relevant public primarily to refer to that genus, it was a generic
term that could never be trademarked. 66 The addition of “.com” did
not affect registrability because it did not create any additional
meaning. 67 The TTAB did consider whether further services were
offered online, but maintained that “even if the term
‘MATTRESS.COM’ might have significance for a different set of
services [from those offered at a] brick and mortar store, [it was]
irrelevant to whether the term was perceived by the public as
naming the genus of services for which registration is sought, i.e.,
online mattress stores.” 68 Public perception, even if incorrect,
affected the TTAB’s generic categorization.
The Federal Circuit agreed that “MATTRESS.COM” was

61

Id. at 1302.
Id. at 1302-03.
63
1800Mattress, 586 F.3d at 1362-63.
64
Id. at 1364.
65
Id. at 1361.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 1362.
62
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generic based on how the relevant public understood the term. 69
The court proceeded to analyze the two components of the mark,
“mattress” and the TLD “.com,” and concluded that
“MATTRESS.COM,” as understood by the relevant public, was no
more than the “sum of its constituent parts, viz., an online provider
of mattresses.” 70 Dictionary definitions and other domain names
influenced the court’s decision. The Federal Circuit had recently
affirmed the TTAB’s denial of a trademark for “hotels.com,”
noting that the TTAB gave “controlling weight to the large number
of similar uses of ‘hotels’ with a dot-com suffix, as well as the
common meaning and dictionary definition of ‘hotels’ and the
standard usage of ‘.com’ to show a commercial internet domain.” 71
In this case, even if some of the other websites containing
“MATTRESS.COM” in their domain names did not actually sell
mattresses online, the fact that many of them did conduct online
sales supported the TTAB’s conclusion that the marks are of the
same genus. 72 Consumers would then immediately associate
“MATTRESS.COM” with a commercial website rendering retail
services for mattresses, which is generic. 73
The court disagreed with the applicant’s contention that
“MATTRESS.COM” evoked the quality of comfort in mattresses
and maintained that the mark is not a mnemonic. 74 Unlike the
possible play on words in Steelbuilding, there was no evidence that
the relevant public found a double entendre in the term
“MATTRESS.COM.” 75 Quoting Steelbuilding, the Federal Circuit
reiterated that only in “rare instances will the addition of a TLD
indicator to a descriptive term operate to create a distinctive
mark.” 76 Since the court was not engaging in an analysis of
“MATTRESS.COM” as a descriptive term, it is unclear why the
court felt it necessary to emphasize this point. There was no
69

Id.
1800Mattress, 586 F.3d at 1363.
71
In re Hotels.com, 573 F.3d 1300, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
72
1800Mattress, 586 F.3d at 1364.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id. (citing Steelbuilding, 415 F.3d 1293, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
70
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evidence that the “.com” TLD evoked anything but a commercial
Internet domain. 77 As such, the mark was denied trademark
protection on genericness grounds.
V. ADVERTISE.COM: GENERIC CATEGORIZATION
IN AN INFRINGEMENT CASE
The registrability of a domain name has also been analyzed in a
trademark infringement case. The Ninth Circuit recently addressed
trademark protection of AOL’s “ADVERTISING.COM,”
concluding that the district court incorrectly determined that the
mark was descriptive. 78 The district court had granted a
preliminary injunction against Advertise.com on the basis that
“ADVERTISING.COM” was a valid descriptive mark. 79
Advertise.com appealed on the grounds that AOL’s
“ADVERTISING.COM” mark was generic. 80
The Ninth Circuit reiterated that “[c]ontext is critical to a
distinctiveness analysis . . . [and the level of distinctiveness of a
mark] can be determined only by reference to the goods or services
that [the mark] identifies.” 81 In this case, the parties did not dispute
that the genus of “ADVERTISING.COM” was “online
advertising” or “Internet advertising.” 82 The Ninth Circuit looked
at the impression conveyed by “advertising” and “.com,” 83 as well
as how “ADVERTISING.COM” was understood by the
consuming public. 84 Taken separately, the words are clearly
generic. 85 But that did not mean the combined mark was generic.
In an effort to clarify the distinction between generic and
descriptive marks, the court returned to its “familiar” test, asking
77

Id.
Advertise.com, Inc. v. AOL Advertising, Inc., 616 F.3d 974, 977-78 (9th
Cir. 2010).
79
Id. at 976.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 977 (citing Lahoti v. VeriCheck, Inc., 586 F.3d 1190, 1201 (9th Cir.
2009)).
82
Id.
83
Id. at 977-78.
84
Id. at 977-78.
85
Id.
78
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“Who are you/What are you?” 86 In order to gain trademark
protection, a descriptive mark must answer “the buyer’s questions,
‘Who are you? Where do you come from? Who vouches for
you?’” 87 In contrast, “a [generic] name of the product answers the
question, ‘What are you?’” 88 For “advertise.com,” dictionary
definitions strongly suggested that the term was generic. 89 Similar
to Federal Circuit precedent, the court acknowledged that the
addition of “.com” to a mark generally does not strengthen the
mark. 90 AOL’s analogy to Steelbuilding was inapposite:
Steelbuilding represented the rare instance where further meaning
was acquired once the “.com” was added. 91 But here, the services
offered under “ADVERTISING.COM” “remain[ed], at core, the
simple provision of online advertising services.” 92
Furthermore, Advertise.com, the appellant, pointed to 32
separate domain names that incorporated some version of the terms
“advertising.com.” 93 Providing trademark protection would have
made it much more difficult for such companies to describe their
services. 94 Generic marks cannot be trademarked because
competitors would be foreclosed from using a “vast array of
simple, easy to remember domain names and designations that
describe the services provided.” 95 Nevertheless, the court stated
that it was not creating a “per se rule against the use of domain
names, even ones formed by combining generic terms with TLDs,
as trademarks.” 96

86

Id. at 978.
Id.
88
Id. (citing Filipino Yellow Pages, Inc., v. Asian Journal Publ’ns Inc., 198
F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 1999)).
89
Advertise, 616 F.3d at 977-78.
90
Id. at 979 (citing Brookfield Commc’ns v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174
F.3d 1036, 1055 (9th Cir. 1999)).
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id. at 980.
94
Id. at 981.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 982.
87
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VI. CASE LAW SYNTHESIS: VERBS, DOUBLE ENTENDRES, AND
CONSUMER PERCEPTION
Steelbuilding stands out as the one recent case where two
generic words combined into a compound, coupled with a TLD
indicator, almost created a descriptive mark. The failed marks in
1800Mattress and Advertise were generic single words that failed
to create a distinctive mark when joined with a TLD. While it is
difficult to say that a standard for the descriptiveness of domain
names as trademarks has emerged in the federal courts, several
factors seem to increase the likelihood that a court will categorize a
domain name as descriptive.
First, melding two generic words into a compound word
creates the possibility of new meaning that could distinctly identify
the company behind the goods or services provided, thereby
satisfying the “Who are you?” test. Steelbuilding linked an
adjective with a noun to create a composite verb, such that the
Federal Circuit looked not only at the possibility of selling steel
buildings, but alternatively, the actual construction of steel
buildings in an online environment. The two words potentially
functioned as a verb, thereby moving the mark from purely generic
into possibly descriptive.
Second, where a possible double entendre exists, it is much less
likely that the mark will be termed generic, and this likelihood
decreases further when two generic words are spliced together. The
mark in Steelbuilding could have been viewed as an adjective and
noun or one compound verb, depending on how the words were
interpreted. It is much more difficult for this kind of layered
meaning to emerge from a single word like “mattress” or
“advertising,” which largely remain confined to one part of speech.
Third, there must be evidence of consumer perception of the
company itself, not merely the umbrella genus of the goods or
services provided. This remains true even if two words are linked
to form a new word that is not necessarily generic. Despite the
dissent’s objections, Steelbuilding failed this test, because its
advertising, polling, repeat customers, and other evidence did not
convince the court that consumers were targeting the company
itself instead of the genus of services. A double entendre was
possible, but there was no evidence that consumers actually
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considered the mark as a verb.
Fourth, should there be a multitude of other domain names
incorporating the same generic word and the same genus of goods
or services, courts will look less favorably on the potential
distinctiveness of the mark. This is best exemplified in Advertise,
where giving trademark protection to AOL’s mark would have
precluded many other companies from using the most logical and
immediate term to describe the services offered on their websites.
The Ninth Circuit did not believe that when consumers visited
“ADVERTISING.COM” they were specifically seeking AOL’s
advertising services.
Fifth, the addition of the TLD “.com” only adds potential
distinctiveness if there is a uniquely interactive, online element to
the goods or services provided over the Internet. The mere sale of
goods or services on a website does not distinguish the mark from
goods or services available in a brick and mortar store.
Steelbuilding allowed consumers to do things online that they
could not do in stores: there were creative elements of design that
made the creation of the building more like solving an economic
puzzle.
Nevertheless, none of the marks in Steelbuilding,
1800Mattress, or Advertise were afforded trademark protection.
What is significant is that “MATTRESS.COM” and
“ADVERTISING.COM” were found to be generic, meaning that
they could never be registered. In contrast, should
“STEELBUILDING.COM” eventually acquire secondary meaning
that satisfies a court that the mark identifies the company itself, not
merely the product offered, it could become a federally registered
mark.
VII. NEW FRONTIERS: “.SPORTS” AND BEYOND
Upcoming expansion of TLDs will provide new trademark
opportunities for companies seeking to register of domain names. 97
97

See generally Eric Nuhl & Dennis S. Prahl, The New Generic Top-Level
Domain Program: A New Era of Risk for Trademark Owners and the Internet,
101 TRADEMARK REP. 1757 (2011).

2012]

OBTAINING TRADEMARK PROTECTION FOR DOMAIN NAMES

77

On June 20, 2011, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Number
and Names (ICANN) held a landmark vote to allow new domain
endings in addition to common endings such as “.com,” “.org,”
“.gov,” and “.edu.” 98 Prior to the vote, there were 22 available
TLDs. 99 But soon, “people will be able to apply to ICANN to
register most any word, in any language, as their domain
ending.” 100 Applications will cost at least $185,000, suggesting
that the TLDs will be primarily for large corporations and
governments. 101
How this development will affect trademark registration is
unclear, but it certainly opens up new possibilities. While the
insertion of a generic noun TLD such as “MATRESS.BEDS” may
be no more distinctive than “MATTRESS.COM,” a TLD like
“STEELBUILDING.DESIGN” might push the mark into the
descriptive category because a specific company’s additional
online services would be highlighted by the TLD. Most companies,
of course, will not have the financial resources to purchase such a
specific TLD. But the availability of a more targeted TLD may
create new opportunities for larger companies to trademark domain
names that may have previously been deemed generic.
CONCLUSION
Recent trademark domain name cases demonstrate that courts
are reluctant to view marks that are logically related to the genus of
the goods or services provided as anything but generic. Should the
mark contain a compound word with additional meaning beyond
its constituent parts, a double entendre, consumer recognition,
minimal overlap with other domain names, or an online, interactive
element, the likelihood of registrability as a descriptive mark
increases. The courts have not ruled out the possibility of a
descriptive domain name gaining distinctiveness to the point where
98
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it is protectable.
The possibility of new generic TLDs creates further avenues
for distinctiveness (such as if the TLD suggests the unique online
services provided), but ultimately, if the TLD remains generic, the
same problems arise when trying to pass the “Who are you?” test.
A more dynamic universe of TLDs, however, provides further
opportunities for the creation of distinctive verbs, wordplay, and
double entendres, and the creation of a descriptive mark.
Ultimately, if providers of online goods or services desire a
registrable mark, they will want to move into the arbitrary/fanciful
category. Should they insist on a word that relates to the genus of
their goods or services, Steelbuilding and other recent cases
provide some guidance for shifting the court’s lens from the
generic to the descriptive, but also suggest caution regarding the
likelihood of success.
PRACTICE POINTERS


Because courts of appeals do not apply a bright line rule when
reviewing whether a domain name is generic or descriptive,
there is a premium on establishing a fact-intensive record at the
trial-court level. These types of cases are won on the facts.



The importance of building a factual record is reinforced by the
relevant standards of review, which are deferential to the
factual findings of the TTAB (“substantial evidence” standard)
or the trial court (“clearly erroneous” standard).



The prospect of new, diverse TLDs increases the possibility
that a domain name could acquire trademark protection, but
this remains an unexplored frontier.

